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1. Introduction 
In July 2007, the United Nations Security Council 
agreed to establish a new peacekeeping mission 
for Darfur, UNAMID, to support a fragile peace 
process and protect civilians and humanitarian 
agencies in that region. UNAMID will assume the 
duties and mandate of the existing African Union 
Mission in Sudan, AMIS. It  will also take over the 
work in Darfur of the current UN mission to 
Sudan, UNMIS, whose primary responsibility will 
remain providing support for the implementation 
of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) between the Government of Sudan (GoS) 
and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. The 
establishment of UNAMID and the transferral of 
peacekeeping and humanitarian mandates for 
Darfur from UNMIS and AMIS, provides a critical 
opportunity to revisit and address some of the key 
challenges of UNMIS and linked international 
peacekeeping efforts, and to build a strong 
operational foundation for the new Darfur mission. 
 
The new UN mission comes at a challenging 
juncture. Rising tensions around delays, 
disagreements and conflict over the CPA’s 
implementation are threatening to unravel the 
foundational North-South peace process, which 
would have critical and highly negative 
implications for the wider peace process in Sudan. 
At the same time, the Darfur conflict is becoming 
increasingly complex and challenging, as the 
number of armed groups multiplies, the strategic 
positioning of combatants in peace negotiations 
shift unpredictably and the humanitarian crisis 
deepens. There is risk that parallel and fragile 
peace processes in North-Southern Sudan, East 
Sudan and Darfur could disintegrate and 
recombine in a powerful momentum towards 
wide-scale armed conflict. 
 
The international community has a critical role to 
play to ensure this does not happen. However, 
evidence from the current engagement of UNMIS, 
donors and international humanitarian Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in support of 
the CPA suggests there are significant obstacles to 
be overcome. Central among these are difficulties 
which have emerged with UNMIS, its structures, 
leadership and resources; its engagement with 
other UN, inter-governmental and donor agencies; 
and its working relationship with humanitarian 
NGOs.  
 
This report aims to support international efforts to 
strengthen UNMIS and establish an efficient and 
effective UNAMID, by critically reviewing 
problems encountered and lessons learned in the 
current UN mission. The report is based on an 
extensive 2007 field study in Southern Sudan, 
Southern Kordofan and Khartoum, during which 
more than 70 interviews were carried out with a 
wide variety of stakeholders at national and local 
level, including: the UN Mission and UN 
agencies, multilateral donor agencies, diplomats, 
government, international and national 
humanitarian NGOs, academics and journalists. 
Evidence was also compiled from official 
documentation, unpublished research and 
materials from official and NGO sources, and a 
desk top survey of media and grey literature. 
 
The study findings identify critical weaknesses in 
the international community’s support for the 
CPA, including: 
 inadequate institutional coordination and 
cooperation within the UN mission; 
 ambiguous political leadership in UNMIS, the 
UN and from donors; 
 unclear and fragmented strategic approaches to 
humanitarian work by the UN mission, 
multilateral agencies, donors and NGOs; and 
 insufficient resources and weak processes of 
resource allocation. 
 
The findings also underscore positive lessons 
emerging from the experiences of UNMIS and its 
international and national partners, and identify 
new opportunities for strengthening UNMIS and 
UNAMID. These include: 
 a capacity for institutional adaptation around 
planning and cooperation, notably at local 
operational level; 
 the experience of improved coordination 
among UNMIS, donors, government and NGOs, 
involving for example advocacy around 
humanitarian access; 
 opportunities for strengthened leadership in the 
UN mission and at donor level, following recent 
changes in key leadership positions in both; and  
 clarification and restructuring of UNMIS’ 
operational mandate, with the establishment of 
UNAMID for Darfur. 
 
Donors occupy a critical position in each of these 
junctures involving the UN mission in Sudan. This 
report provides evidence-based recommendations 
for strengthening donor support to the expanded 
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international peacekeeping mission in the country. 
Among the key recommendations are the 
following: 
 the need for the development by the UN and 
donors of a more clearly wholistic approach to 
peacekeeping and humanitarian engagement in 
Sudan, encompassing the range of conflicts based 
in different geographical regions of the country; 
 the lending of greater political and diplomatic 
support from the UN Secretariat, donors and 
international community to the field leadership of 
the UN mission in Sudan; 
 the need for the provision of expanded funding 
and other resources for UNMIS activities in 
support of the CPA; 
 the need for donor insistence on improved 
coordination and cooperation among components 
of the UN Country Team in Sudan; and  
 the need for more systematic inclusion of 
humanitarian NGOs and development agencies in 
the planning and funding of humanitarian and 
development work in support of the CPA. 
 
 
 
2. Institutional issues 
2.1 Overlapping and competing jurisdictions 
2.2 ‘Stovepipe’ management  
2.3 UN Agencies  
2.4 NGO impacts 
2.5 Donor interventions affect agency differences  
2.6 Lessons in cooperation from Southern 
Kordofan  
2.6 New opportunities 
 
 
2. Institutional issues 
Security Council Resolution 1590 of 24 March 
2005 established the UN Mission to Sudan 
(UNMIS) to work in support of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.1 The UN’s 
Unified Mission Plan for Sudan specifically 
mandates the UN Secretary-General Special 
Representative in Sudan (SRSG) with 
coordinating all UN system activities in the 
                                                 
1 UNMIS’ mandate includes assistance in 
implementation of specific aspects of the CPA such as 
monitoring, peacebuilding and assistance with 
elections, but also entails other key interventions, 
including assisting in the return of refugees and 
displaced people; demining; and promoting human 
rights and the protection of civilians, and vulnerable 
groups particularly. 
country. The SRSG, a post occupied by Jan Pronk 
until his expulsion by the GoS in late 2006, is 
deputised by the Principal Deputy Special 
Representative (PDSRSG), and Deputy Special 
Representative Resident and Humanitarian 
Coordinators Office (DSRSG/RC/HC). According 
to the Mission Plan, the PDSRG retains deputised 
responsibility for management of mostly political 
issues and functions, including political and civil 
affairs, human rights, rule of law, the UN police, 
information and electoral matters. The 
DSRSG/RC/HC, on its part, is tasked with a range 
of planning and implementation functions around 
humanitarian, recovery and development, security 
and other issues. It is specifically charged with 
coordinating the UN Country Team –  which 
includes more than fifteen UN agencies – under 
the Resident Coordinator’s Office (RCO), and 
with coordinating all international humanitarian  
organisations in their engagements with the UN, 
the Governments of Sudan and Southern Sudan, 
and international donors.  
 
The Mission Plan sets the terms for an 
“integrated” country mission, the large scale of 
which is an exception in the UN system.2 UNMIS’ 
multi-sector, multi-layered organisational structure 
brings several challenges. The Mission’s multiple 
units and divisions are deployed in six operational 
Sectors and across 12 field offices, headquartered 
in Khartoum. However the boundaries and 
responsibilities among units are sometimes ill-
defined, unclear, contested and susceptible to 
modification in practice. In this context, the 
mission’s vertically-oriented reporting and 
coordinating structures have proved problematic.  
 
Stresses on management have been compounded 
by the inclusion of other UN agencies and 
international humanitarian organisations within the 
UN’s “integrated mission” approach. From the 
outset, UNMIS’ overlapping responsibilities have 
proved a challenge, particularly in the context of a 
delicate political and operational environment in 
which an increasing number of donors and 
humanitarian agencies are engaged. Growing 
demands on UNMIS have placed high stress on its 
                                                 
2 See Sudan Unified Mission Plan (2005) for details of 
the mission’s complexity, involving UNMIS, UN 
Country Team, plus new agencies added during the 
Darfur crisis and pre- and post-CPA period. 
Humanitarian agencies are also included under the UN 
coordinating role as part of the “integrated mission” 
approach. 
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organisational capacities at national and local 
operational level. While institutional coherence 
was important to establish on the ground, this has 
been lacking in many regard, and has been further 
undermined by changes in the scope of UNMIS’ 
mandate with the Darfur crisis and assignment of 
large additional responsibilities to the mission. 
Institutional fragility was exacerbated by attacks 
on the political leadership of UNMIS in late 2006, 
which left the mission without an effective 
political head for more than ten months. 
  
2.1 Overlapping and competing jurisdictions 
There is lack of clarity within UNMIS over the 
jurisdiction of many units and agencies that have 
overlapping mandates. Such confusion is reflected 
in the changing responsibilities for important 
UNMIS activities; for example UNMIS/RRR, the 
recovery component of which has been taken over 
by the UNDP. Unclear institutional responsibilities 
for UNMIS protection, information and human 
rights promotion activities have helped nurture 
antagonism among UNMIS units, not integration 
and efficiency. 3   
 
UNMIS’ lack of institutional clarity has also 
fostered uncertainty among government, donors 
and NGO partners about how and where to engage 
the mission. A recent study of IDP returns to 
Southern Sudan and the Three Areas revealed that 
key government and NGO players were unsure 
which UNMIS units had coordinating 
responsibilities for assisting with return and 
reintegration: UNMIS/RRR, the RCO, 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) 
and Joint Logistics Coordination were all 
involved, but their division of duties was not 
explicitly known.4 The report confirmed this 
study´s findings of tensions between UNMIS, and 
UN agencies and NGOs in Southern Kordofan, 
where UNMIS is widely seen as isolated in its 
planning and operational activities. Mistrust, 
                                                 
3 Some NGO sources note that within UNMIS, unclear 
responsibilities among units and offices targeting RRR, 
Protection, Civil Affairs and Human Rights, are an 
example of ill-defined institutional overlap leading to 
uncertainty and diminished engagement by external 
partners.  
4 Sara Pantuliano, Margie Buchanan-Smith and Paul 
Murphy, The long road home: Opportunities and 
obstacles to the reintegration of IDPs and refugees 
returning to Southern Sudan and the Three Areas, 
Report of Phase I (London: Humanitarian Policy 
Group, Overseas Development Institute, August 2007). 
competition and inadequate coordination has been 
the outcome.  
 
Fragmented and compartmentalized mandates 
within UNMIS, and the lack of a coherent and 
flexible mission strategy, have contributed to a 
narrow approach in meeting critical functions. For 
example, the provision of security and the putting 
in place of measures that aid in recovery and 
development, are both integral aspects of support 
for returnees and their reintegration. Yet in the key 
case of Southern Kordofan – a high-returns and 
highly-volatile weaponised area – UNMIS failed 
to implement this responsibility. Instead, UNMIS’ 
“security” objectives have been mostly limited to 
preventing the outbreak and escalation of armed 
conflict. There has been little planning and 
provision of protection for returnees; and there has 
been a near-complete failure to implement DDR.5  
 
Many feel that UNMIS has been conservative, 
inflexible and slow to react to urgent needs, partly 
due to its divided responsibilities and a  narrow 
strategic visions at operational level. Government, 
NGOs and many communities blame UNMIS for 
slow delivery of “development” and services in an 
environment of growing needs exacerbated by the 
pressures of high returns. They see the mission as 
unable or unwilling to make the link between 
returns, reintegration and peace-building, and of 
dealing with the issue creatively.  
 
In Southern Kordofan, comparison of UNMIS’ 
recent performance with that of earlier peace 
making and recovery structures has been 
disparaging. 6 It is widely felt that the effective and 
rapid addressing of urgent needs in the post-
                                                 
5 One UN informant argued that even while UNMIS 
has identified narrower and inadequate goals for 
enhancing “security” in Southern Kordofan, it has no 
clear strategy for proceeding with DDR activities that 
would disable the conditions for weaponised conflicts. 
6 In 2002-2005 the Joint Military Commission (JMC), a 
grouping of organisations and individuals with 
international support and the cooperation of the main 
parties to the conflict, successfully undertook 
monitoring of the ceasefire and initiation of localized 
peace-building activities. The latter included the rapid 
identification and targeting of basic services urgently 
needed (such as water pumps and health inputs) in 
collaboration with local communities, villages, 
commanders on both sides. Linking peace with 
“development” in its most rudimentary forms was seen 
as a key component in the success of the JMC. 
Strengthening International Support for Peacekeeping in Sudan: Lessons from UNMIS 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4 
Ceasefire period has been replaced by UNMIS 
bureaucracy and protocol. This is experienced as 
inaction and unwarranted delays. Resentment and 
tension is growing in Southern Kordofan and 
Southern Sudan on the part of government, 
communities and humanitarian and development 
agencies, and is threatening the lead coordinating 
role of UNMIS at operational level. 
 
2.2 ‘Stovepipe’ management  
Institutional isolation within UNMIS has been 
nurtured by “vertical” forms of reporting and 
command. Several sources within UNMIS at 
Khartoum and Sector level observed a tendency 
towards “stovepipe” management, in which 
vertically-oriented reporting and decision-making 
within mission units has had the effect of isolating 
Sector-level mission units from each other. While 
agencies report upwards, not horizontally within 
their zone of operation, strategic planning and 
decision-making proceed in a top-down fashion. 
Efforts to establish thematic cooperation among 
UNMIS units with intersecting functions are seen 
by many to have been inadequate. In an 
environment typified by units and agency offices 
with overlapping operational mandates, the 
outcome has been diminished effectiveness of 
coordination and strategic interventions at sector 
level. In this regard, isolated ‘stovepipe’ command 
chains within UN agencies have helped to 
disaggregate unit operations in what was meant to 
be integrated mission. 
 
2.3 UN Agencies  
A widely-held view is that many UN agencies in 
Sudan are reluctant to cede planning and 
operational jurisdiction to UNMIS (more 
specifically the RCO) or other UN agencies. There 
are also questions over the extent to which some 
agencies are willing to share responsibilities. As a 
result, planning and coordination within a “team 
approach” has been undermined. Moreover, while 
information sharing within the UNCT does take 
place, a common perception is that strategic policy 
and planning choices by individual UN agencies 
are made at their head office level, outside Sudan. 
Typically, the UN agencies share information and 
coordinate around logistics, but plan and cooperate 
only superficially around broader humanitarian 
and development strategies.  
 
In some instances intense joint programmes 
involving several UN agencies have been 
developed at local or regional level under the 
leadership of a designated mandated agency, and 
demonstrating signs of forward movement around 
institutional coordination at operational level.7 
More typically however, operational organisations 
engage UN agencies most effectively in bilateral 
contexts. Broader operational coordination among 
UN agencies and NGOs therefore remains 
disjointed, and often confined to information-
sharing.  
 
Many point to the SRSG’s low capacity to develop 
a viable strategic vision for engagement, and the 
RCO’s corresponding low capacity in developing 
and implementing a unified country strategy, as a 
critical obstacle for the Sudan mission. This is 
seen as contributing to a fragile policy consensus 
within the UNCT. For NGOs, low inter-agency 
consensus and fragmentation of UN agency 
strategies stand as disincentives for engagement 
with UNMIS. Participation by NGOs in non-
operational inter-agency structures is therefore 
generally weak, especially at national level. Local 
level inter-agency group structures are still seen by 
many NGOs as useful platforms for sharing 
information – but not for coordinating activities in 
any substantial, systematic way. 
 
2.4 NGO impacts 
While UNMIS is structured as an integrated 
exercise, and specifically includes cooperation and 
coordination with external agencies like NGOs, in 
practice this process has tended to work less 
smoothly at national level than at operational level 
in the field. Some NGOs cite persistent lack of 
clarity (and effective disagreement) within 
UNMIS and the UNCT about UN strategy, and 
suggest that this has encouraged the deflection of 
the most effective contact with UNMIS and UN 
agencies to lower levels of operation. However, 
this has also contributed to the emergence of 
critical policy gaps on key issues at Khartoum 
level engagements among  NGOs and the UN. For 
example, the absence of effective operational 
frameworks for NGOs within the unified mission 
on the sensitive issue of “protection” has been a 
source problems.  
                                                 
7 For example, the UNDP-led Community 
Empowerment Programme (started 2006) which 
incorporates multiple donors and humanitarian and 
development organisations, and the UNICEF-led 
Integrated Community Development Project (2007-
2009), involving five UN Agencies. Both initiatives are 
based in Southern Kordofan. 
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The lack of a clear agreed framework delineating 
the roles, responsibilities and channels of 
communications among UN and NGO agencies is 
seen by many as having rendered NGOs 
vulnerable to attack from GoS, particularly but not 
exclusively in highly-charged political contexts 
like IDP camps in Darfur. The same problem 
applies more generally in North and Southern 
Sudan where NGO work includes protection, 
human rights and monitoring components. 
 
2.5 Lessons in cooperation from Southern 
Kordofan 
The effects of UNMIS’ institutional and 
coordination shortcomings have been widely 
apparent, notably with regard to the pressurised 
situation of IDPs and refugees in high-returns 
areas like  Southern Kordofan. The case of 
UNMIS/RRR, the main UN coordinating body 
around returns, is exemplary. In Southern 
Kordofan, many feel that UNMIS/RRR has 
demonstrated very low capacity in tracking and 
coordinating assistance to returnees, and in 
overseeing the regular collection and analysis of 
information vital to transport and relocation 
processes. Assessments of, and responses to, 
returnees’ rising needs has been unacceptably 
slow. Follow-up on data provided by other UN 
agencies is delayed and weak, and when urgent 
attention has been recommended UNMIS has 
taken up to 45 days to organise a field response 
due to issues of “logistics”.   
 
Because UNMIS/RRR has failed in the past to 
undertake responsibilities around “reintegration”, 
this work has effectively come under the 
jurisdiction of the UNDP. Meanwhile, the UNMIS 
unit mostly failed to plan for a comprehensive 
assessment of returnees’ situations on the ground, 
in support of informed planning for reintegration 
and peace-building.8 As a result of these 
shortcomings there is growing resentment towards 
UNMIS/RRR within local communities, 
operational humanitarian organisations and sister 
UN agencies. This is diminishing community trust 
and cooperation in the unit, and undermining the 
work of a centrally important UNMIS activity. 
 
                                                 
8 IOM, in collaboration with the UK-based ODI and the 
Nuba Mountains International Association for 
Development, a local NGO, has recently taken a lead 
role in this process. 
On the other hand, there are positive cases of 
closer cooperation and integrated planning among 
UN agencies, donors and NGOs, which stand as 
examples to be emulated. In Southern Kordofan, 
the UNDP is spearheading a Community 
Empowerment Programme in partnership with 24 
local communities, UN agencies and NGOs. This  
combines aspects of locally-driven needs and risk 
assessments, recovery and development planning, 
and aims to help cement peace building by 
obtaining local buy-in for development. In the 
same areas, UNICEF is leading a coalition of five 
UN agencies in a pilot Integrated Community 
Development Project. This initiative will start by 
targeting 15 needy and vulnerable villages for 
basic needs cluster interventions, and include 
aspects of local level cooperation with 
humanitarian and development NGOs in rolling 
out the programme – notably, in pursing the 
provision of complementary inputs from NGOs as 
part of their own interventions in the region.  
 
NGOs see the potential of strong mutual benefits 
from this kind of locally-coordinated planning and 
implementation. Many note the positive outcomes 
of collaborative work in geographically delimited 
areas where intensive multiple initiatives exist, 
and where intensive preparatory consultations and 
joint assessments have taken place. Such work, 
they note, is invaluable for the development of a 
clear, phased strategy that targets potential crisis 
points in communities. An additional contributing 
factor in building success is the undisputed and 
“championing” leadership of an agency or unit 
that drives a project and ensures that a clear 
strategy is kept on track through regular 
consultation with cooperating agencies.  
 
2.6  New opportunities  
UNMIS has been beset from the outset by severe 
institutional and management challenges. Several 
of these have since been compounded by the 
Darfur emergency and the accompanying 
additional political and logistical responsibilities 
for UNMIS, and by political attacks on the senior 
ranks of the mission including the office of SRSG. 
 
The establishment of UNAMID represents an 
opportunity for rethinking and redressing UNMIS’ 
and the UNCT’s institutional shortfalls. Clarity is 
now needed concerning the relationship between 
the two peacekeeping missions, and between them 
and the SRSG and the UNCT. Transparency and 
greater institutional clarity in the establishment of 
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new arrangements can serve as a means for 
consolidating institutional strengths within 
UNMIS and the UNCT, and building a more 
effective mission in UNAMID. There is strong 
feeling among many donors and NGOs that this 
process is both needed and overdue. 
 
Recent positive experiences arising from inter-
agency engagements in operational sites suggests 
that a key problem plaguing UNMIS has been the 
development of clear lines of horizontal and 
vertical communication and administrative 
cooperation. At the same time, there is evidence 
that these challenges can be overcome by more 
effective consultation at local and sector level, 
among UN agencies, donors, Government, NGOs 
and local communities. There is strong need to 
take these positive experiences into account when 
revising institutional and command structures in 
the current period of transition in advance of 
UNAMID’s deployment. 
 
 
  
3. Leadership Issues 
3.1 SRSG and UNMIS leadership 
3.2 Sector level successes 
3.3 UN vulnerabilities 
3.4 Donors: fragmented approaches 
3.5 Lessons from ‘Humanitarian Space’ 
3.6 New opportunities 
 
3. Leadership Issues 
The performance of command structures within 
UNMIS and UNCT raises questions about the 
consolidation of authority within decentralised 
operational structures, and points to the risks faced 
by humanitarian agencies when political 
leadership is weakened and vulnerable. In the 
coming period, when a new UN peacekeeping 
mission will be inaugurated as the existing 
UNMIS faces new critical tests associated with the 
transition towards elections in 2009 and Southern 
Sudan referendum on unity in 2011, the demands 
on leadership capacity in the UN system in Sudan 
will increase substantially. It is critically important 
that lessons from the recent experience of UNMIS 
and Darfur relief efforts be reviewed with a view 
to strengthening structures and processes on the 
ground. 
 
3.1 SRSG and UNMIS  leadership 
While leadership responsibility for UNMIS rests 
primarily with the SRSG, it is widely-held within 
and outside the mission that the office has 
struggled to establish its leading role and notably, 
to develop and implement a strategic vision for 
UNMIS and the UNCT. The first Special 
Representative, Jan Pronk, was faced with 
multiple challenges in consolidating operational 
structures and policy at the start-up of UNMIS, 
and was slow to put in place a strong political 
strategy. By 2006 relations with GoS were 
increasingly marked by tension and conflict, 
largely manufactured by GoS as part of its own 
strategy around Darfur. This eventually led to 
GoS’ effective expulsion of Pronk in late 2006. 
Critically, however, Pronk’s expulsion was only 
mildly rebuked by the UN Secretariat, and he was 
not replaced by a substantial political head until 
September 2007. For nearly a year, an Acting 
SRSG9 occupied the senior UNMIS position with 
a notably low profile and with little discernible 
impact on recouping ground lost with the attack on 
Pronk. As a result, according to many observers, 
there was no effective undisputed “No.1” at 
UNMIS for an extended period. An important 
consequence was the further erosion of UNMIS’ 
already fragile capacity to develop viable 
operational strategies in a period of mounting 
conflict and tension; and critically, to obtain buy-
in from a range of UN and non-UN humanitarian 
and development agencies.  
 
Within UNMIS and the UNCT, there has been far 
less mutual engagement among senior structures in 
the operational context than is suggested by the 
Unified Mission Plan.  Part of the problem stems 
from inadequate inter-institutional coordination 
and the growing policy-making incursions of the 
UNDP and large donors in the shaping of recovery 
and development activities in Southern Sudan and 
the Three Areas.  But weaknesses at the top level 
of UNMIS leadership have also been a factor. The 
political constraints of government, multiple 
operational  requirements specified for UNMIS, 
and in 2005-06, the growing and large needs 
                                                 
9 The Acting SRSG post was filled by Tayé-Brook 
Zerihoun, UNMIS’ PDSRSG, who is regarded by many 
sources as having been insufficiently assertive in 
defending key aspects of UNMIS’ mandate at 
operational level around political affairs. It is notable 
that while the PDSRSG is accorded substantial political 
responsibility in the Unified Mission Plan, in practice 
the PDSRSG is seldom identified by sources inside and 
outside the UN as a leading or significant political 
player in UNMIS engagement with government and 
donors. 
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associated with the Darfur humanitarian 
emergency, together pointed to the need for 
consolidated and focused leadership under the 
SRSG. Many inside and outside the UN identified 
weaknesses in this regard. The UNMIS leadership 
was seen as insufficiently attentive in setting time-
frames and criteria for making and implementing 
agreements with the authorities; and as providing 
mixed signals to partners on core elements of UN 
country strategy.  
 
Some NGOs point to the slow pace of progress on 
the “humanitarian space” initiative by the RCO 
and the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) in 2006-07. Critical measures 
enabling greater humanitarian access in Darfur 
were only meaningfully pursued by the RCO and 
OCHA after continued prodding from NGOs and 
donors. For organisations working in support of 
the CPA in North and Southern Sudan, there is a 
widely-held perception that UNMIS’ strategic 
objectives in Darfur came to undermine its 
univocal commitment to implementing its primary 
mission.10 The need to maintain access to Darfur 
left UNMIS vulnerable to political leverage from 
GoS, and at the same time weakened any strategic 
vision concerning North-South activities. Some 
NGO observers argue that instead of providing 
political leadership based on principles and 
strategic vision, the UNMIS leadership 
increasingly became bogged down in the politics 
of negotiation and conciliation. This is seen as a 
potentially disastrous approach in the context of 
Sudan, where multiple conflicts and peace-making 
processes exist side-by-side, and where 
concessions for gains in one peace-making process 
can lead to the undermining of established 
positions in another. GoS, rooted at the centre of 
these multiple conflicts and processes, is well-
placed to exploit prevarication and conciliation on 
the part of UNMIS. For many observers, it is clear 
that GoS will continue to seize such opportunities 
in the absence of strong, politically univocal 
UNMIS leadership coordinated through the SRSG. 
 
3.2 Sector level successes 
Comparative evidence suggests that UNMIS’ local 
performance has been strengthened in instances 
                                                 
10 In this explanation, the leadership’s shifting strategy 
involving Darfur was heavily influenced by pressures 
from donor governments and international NGOs, 
themselves responding to powerful international 
advocacy campaigns focused on the Darfur crisis. 
where local leadership has been more assertive, 
strategic and operationally-focused. However, the 
effectiveness of UNMIS local operations is 
circumscribed in North Sudan by the degree of 
support UNMIS headquarters in Khartoum 
provide to the local Sector leadership, and here 
there have been problems. In some notable 
instances the SRSG and PDSRSG failed to 
intervene with sufficient commitment and 
assertiveness to defend UNMIS’ rights and 
privileges.11 As a result the integrity, effectiveness 
and public perception of the mission was 
undermined locally.  
 
The discrepancies between sector- and 
headquarter-level engagements stem partly from 
their proximity to operational functions. 
Coordination, policy making and decision making 
in Khartoum take place in an environment that is 
leadership-focused, and relatively removed from 
operational obstacles – and opportunities. This 
means that leadership at headquarters, in reality, 
often has low capacity to respond to the kinds of 
complex and specifically local operational needs 
arising in different sectors; and has diminished 
incentive to integrate such issues in centralised 
decision-making processes. Therefore, while the 
decentralisation of UNMIS structures across six 
operational Sectors offers the potential for 
effective UNMIS coordination in a variety of local 
contexts, this has been undermined by a pattern of 
isolated decision-making at national headquarters 
level; as well as by the diffusion of leadership 
authority through a range of competing agencies in 
the UNCT. 
 
3.3 UN vulnerabilities 
The 2006 expulsion of UNMIS political chief Jan 
Pronk was an unprecedented attack by a host 
government on a UN peacekeeping mission. The 
resulting relatively mild response by the UN 
Secretariat in New York underlined a further 
challenge facing UNMIS leadership: an unusually 
high level of tolerance by the UN for abuse of its 
mission at the hands of GoS and its coordinating 
                                                 
11 For example, in Abyei the effective confinement of 
UNMIS to Sector base by GoS (and later GoSS) was 
not adequately challenged by the SRSG or PDSRSG in 
Khartoum, which are primarily responsible for 
engaging with government on these issues.   
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body, the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC).12 
Ambiguous political commitment was also 
reflected in the New York Secretariat’s hesitancy 
to invest additional political capital in shoring up 
UNMIS’ expanding mission in Darfur.  
 
Inadequate insistence on political and resource 
support for UNMIS at the UN Secretariat  has 
been noted by NGO advocacy campaigns working 
on Sudan. The latter have consistently called for 
increased resource flows enabling the filling of 
staff complements with experienced peacekeeping 
and humanitarian professionals;13 but especially, 
for the political strengthening of the mission by 
the provision of strong international backing for 
UNMIS and insistence on the recognition of its 
status and authority as specified in Resolution 
1590 and subsequent protocols. Many NGOs 
argue that the demonstrated weaknesses of 
UNMIS and its struggling leadership are signs of 
insufficient commitment and support from UN 
headquarters, and the broader international 
community. Part of the solution to the problem of 
UNMIS’ sub-optimal performance therefore 
involves addressing the shortfalls of the broader 
UN and international diplomatic approach to 
engaging Sudan. 
 
In the Pronk case, while there was speculation 
over the specific circumstances leading to his 
expulsion, the weak UN response unquestionably 
diminished UNMIS’ local credibility and authority 
at a critical time, following months of escalating 
violence and targeting of humanitarian agencies in 
Darfur.  The perception of diminished political 
authority provided important opportunities for 
exploitation by the GoS and other Sudanese 
interests. Humanitarian NGOs, recalling 2006 
attacks on Darfur-based humanitarian workers and 
officials, expulsions of UN and NGO officers,14 
                                                 
12 UNMIS sources suggest that UNMIS Khartoum-
based leadership, too, was surprised by the levels of 
tolerance and inaction in New York.  
13 UNMIS sources from a variety of Sectors underscore 
the mission’s below-normal staff complements, the 
comparatively junior ranking of officers put in middle 
and senior positions of authority, and difficulty of 
attracting experienced and competent staff to difficult 
working environments with compensation packages 
paid in US dollars that are diminishingly attractive and 
competitive. 
14 Oxfam’s Country Director was removed on GoS’ 
order in 2006. More worrying was the effective 
expulsion of two OCHA heads of office in South 
and increasing problems in reliably obtaining 
visas, permits, customs clearances and other 
government-regulated approvals enabling 
humanitarian work, identify the UNMIS 
leadership’s perceived weakness as a critical 
stumbling block in NGOs’ consolidation of 
political room for manoeuvre. In this sense, the 
effective erosion of UNMIS’ political capital via 
engagements with GoS on Darfur had important 
and damaging spill-over effects for the core 
UNMIS mission in North and Southern Sudan. 
 
3.4 Donors: fragmented approaches 
Existing weaknesses in political leadership in the 
UN mission have been importantly exacerbated by 
lack of cohesion and shared political strategy 
among many donors in support of UNMIS, and 
notably around issues of humanitarian protection. 
There has been generally weak action from 
European Union countries in support of 
humanitarian space, as traditional diplomatic tools 
(démarches, public and joint pronouncements of 
various kinds) have not been used effectively in 
the difficult circumstances of 2006 up to May 
2007. In the case of the NRC’s 2006 removal from 
Darfur, it took five weeks for EU to register an 
official complaint with GoS. In early 2007, 
diplomats failed entirely to protest the GoS’ denial 
of entry permits for the UN-appointed Jodi 
Williams Commission.15  
 
Opportunities have regularly been missed by EU 
diplomats based in Sudan to mount more effective 
support for both UNMIS and international 
humanitarian and development efforts, and several 
sources note competing interests and objectives 
among EU countries in particular with regard to 
Sudan. As a result the EU, for example, has been 
slow to develop an effective, coherent common 
humanitarian policy approach, which was still 
awaiting approval from governments in Brussels 
in mid 2007.16 Some diplomats see part of the 
                                                                            
Darfur, neither of which was protested by OCHA to its 
GoS counterpart, HAC. 
15 While the UN-delegated Commissioners waited in 
Addis Ababa for permission to enter Sudan, some in the 
EU delegation insisted on an EU diplomatic démarche 
to protest the GoS action. But this suggestion was 
rejected by other Khartoum-based EU diplomats who 
said it would have no constructive impact. “Silence was 
preferred to bothersome noise”, according to one EU 
diplomat involved in the issue. 
16 As a consequence the important instrument, the 
European Commission for Humanitarian Operations 
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problem as originating in the relatively low station 
ranking that Sudan had until recently: for the most 
part, junior ranking EU ambassadors were in 
Sudan when Darfur erupted and they proved 
politically weak, uncreative, and professionally 
slow in response to the crisis.  
 
That situation no longer pertains, yet diplomatic 
activity has been slow to catch up to the real 
political needs demonstrated by UNMIS’ 
increasingly obvious vulnerabilities. Typically EU 
representatives in a country meet every year to 
review the principles of a common approach 
among ambassadors. In Sudan, however, this 
process only began in early 2007: before this, the 
EU ambassadors had not met to discuss strategy 
and common positions for about five years.  
 
Diplomatic sources note continuing signs of inertia 
in the wider diplomatic community, and argue that 
the weight of western diplomatic interventions 
(particularly on critical issues of humanitarian 
access and protection) have been led by a few key 
players including the US, UK, Norway and the 
Netherlands. Many diplomatic and NGO sources 
point to the critically important role of donors in 
the recent campaign around ‘humanitarian space’ 
as suggestive of the broader potential of strategic 
diplomatic engagement in support of UNMIS and 
the UN’s engagement in Sudan. 
 
Some analysts have suggested that greater 
“diplomatic activism” be undertaken to encourage 
and support the work of existing weakened 
structures, notably the Assessment and Evaluation 
Commission (AEC), the joint structure of national 
and international parties and observers to the CPA, 
which is tasked with monitoring the CPA’s 
implementation and is chaired Norwegian Tom 
Vraalsen. The International Crisis Group, for 
example, suggests that the vital work of the AEC 
has been hampered by procedural issues put 
forward by the NCP and by other constraints, and 
recommends that a “shadow structure” of UN and 
embassy representatives be created to unofficially 
                                                                            
(ECHO), was significantly handicapped as it required 
the full political support of governments in Brussels to 
be effective. ECHO in Sudan has been weakened by 
low EU state contributions and the preference by many 
key donors to fund bilaterally and therefore maintain 
greater political direction over resources. ECHO is the 
main funding platform for France, Spain and Greece; 
but Sweden, Finland, the UK, Denmark, Germany and 
Netherlands fund bilaterally.  
carry out important monitoring and reporting 
tasks, with the aim of buttressing awareness and 
attention to violations, delays and other issues 
concerning CPA implementation.17 Recent 
experiences involving donors and others in the 
reassertion of rights to humanitarian access in 
Darfur point to the potential viability and 
importance of such measures. 
 
3.5 Lessons from ‘Humanitarian Space’ 
Recent progress in engagements with GoS around 
rights to ‘humanitarian space’ in Darfur 
underscore not only the political challenges faced 
by UNMIS, the UNCT, donors and NGOs, but 
also the benefits of more focused collective 
political pressure and strategic leadership. While 
the humanitarian space initiative was primarily 
motivated and energised by NGOs working in 
close cooperation with donors, their joint action 
encouraged UNMIS, acting through the RCO and 
OCHA, to play an important role in concluding a 
new and potentially critical agreement with GoS. 
 
Increasing physical and rhetorical attacks on 
humanitarian agencies and workers in Darfur by 
GoS and armed groups; threats, denial of visas and 
permits, expulsions and other hostile interventions 
by HAC designed to restrict and otherwise control 
humanitarian activities; and the introduction of a 
new and constraining NGO Act; set the 
background in 2006 for more focused efforts led 
by humanitarian NGOs demanding greater respect 
for humanitarian protection standards in Darfur.18 
As the key point of engagement on these issues in 
GoS, HAC represented a number of challenges. 
HAC’s low capacity, its fragmented and powerful 
political undercurrents, and its often combative, 
unpredictable interventions tended to destabilize 
planning and implementation of projects by 
humanitarian organisations, and increase the 
financial costs of their work. 
 
HAC also was the key GoS counterpart for the 
UN’s growing humanitarian efforts coordinated by 
OCHA. In this regard, OCHA both carried out 
                                                 
17 International Crisis Group, A Strategy for 
Comprehensive Peace in Sudan (Africa Report No.130, 
26 July 2007). 
18 HAC’s growing incursions on humanitarian activities 
also  included a refusal to abide by key terms of a 2004 
Moratorium on ensuring humanitarian access to Darfur. 
The “Organisation of Voluntary and Humanitarian 
Work Act” was signed by President Bashir in March 
2006. 
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humanitarian work with HAC’s permission and 
was tasked with representing all international 
humanitarian initiatives to GoS through HAC. 
Many in NGO and diplomatic circles recognised 
the problem of conflicting interests and the 
potential for compromise in this situation, and 
cited as an example inadequate leadership by 
OCHA and the DSRSG on the issue of 
humanitarian access. Most NGOs and donors 
agreed that OCHA failed to act early and 
decisively. 
 
In important ways OCHA was on unfamiliar 
ground in Sudan and had insufficient resources to 
address its operational and political weaknesses. 
OCHA’s experience elsewhere (typically in 
situations where governments have been less 
hostile to the UN’s humanitarian presence) did not 
serve the organisation well in Sudan. Strong 
leadership and resources were needed to take stock 
of the new kind of operational terrain and set 
appropriate priorities and strategies – including the 
development of a political strategy in what is a 
highly politicized environment. This was slow to 
happen. NGOs report numerous occasions of 
OCHA failing to respond quickly, predictably and 
effectively to requests for intervention with GoS 
by NGOs. They argue that under pressure from all 
sides, OCHA often did not make NGOs its 
priority, and rather pursued its own and related 
UN interests in engaging HAC and GoS. This 
political problem was compounded by OCHA’s 
inadequate resources and skills, due to under-
funding and recruitment issues that were only 
partly ameliorated by the personal campaigning 
and intervention of OCHA Head of Office Jan 
Egeland, following intensive NGO lobbying and 
advocacy. Even then, NGOs were still 
complaining in early 2007 of spending too much 
time following-up on grievances with OCHA, in 
addition to their entreaties to HAC. 
 
The political and bureaucratic logjam at both HAC 
and OCHA helped provoke renewed collective 
responses among NGOs, which soon shifted to 
include donors and the UN. The NGO Forum, an 
association of 60-70 Khartoum-based NGOs that 
operates informally due to restrictions under the 
NGO Act, intensely lobbied a range of donors and 
delegations19 in late 2006 and early 2007. Through 
                                                 
19 Delegations consulted included the UN Secretary-
General Special Envoy for Darfur, UN Under-
Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and 
an elected eight-member Steering Committee the 
Forum was represented directly on the Khartoum 
Inter-Agency Committee,20 and developed closer 
structured links with the Khartoum-based groups 
of donors and diplomats.  
 
Initially donors had been slow to establish criteria 
for acceptable levels of humanitarian access, and 
provide positive and negative incentives for GoS 
to work by them. The absence of clear signals in 
2006 provided opportunities for intrusive 
interventions by authorities, and undermined the 
humanitarian work of the UN and NGOs. Donors 
and the UN for the most part left such advocacy 
initiatives up to NGOs, and more rapid, forceful 
interventions to protection humanitarian work 
might have resulted from more concerted donor 
efforts. But the urgency of the Darfur crisis and 
increased pace of NGO lobbying around 
humanitarian space issues led to stepped-up donor 
lobbying of UNMIS, HAC and GoS. This resulted 
in a consultative process whose outcome was a 
March 2007 Joint Communiqué on Facilitation of 
Humanitarian Activities in Darfur, signed by the 
DSRSG/RC/HC on behalf of UNMIS, and GoS. 
The agreement set up inclusive structures for 
developing and overseeing protocols enabling 
greater humanitarian access. Importantly, the High 
Level Committee overseeing the process 
specifically included representatives from 
UNMIS, donors and NGOs. 
 
The effectiveness of this latest initiative in 
removing key bureaucratic and technical 
impediments to humanitarian access remains 
uncertain – some NGO sources have reservations 
about the scope and pace of the promised fast-
track approach to lifting restrictions, while noting 
that many other GoS bureaucratic and technical 
impediments remain in place, and that the 
Communiqué applies only to Darfur.21 Some also 
                                                                            
Emergency Relief Coordinator, African Union Special 
Envoy for Darfur, and EU and several other diplomatic 
missions. 
20 Among other tasks, the IAC contributes to UNCT 
work plans and other aspects of UN coordination. 
21 For example, “Technical Agreements” are emerging 
as a new and effective means of controlling 
humanitarian access by placing multiple restrictions on 
human and physical resources. Technical Agreements 
for projects and cooperation need to be concluded as 
part of the procedure for permit and visa applications, 
and require the approval of relevant line ministries – 
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express concern about the manner in which some 
UN officials and diplomats22 linked the process 
with the threat of sanctions, thereby further and 
dangerously risking politicisation of the 
humanitarian access issue. Notwithstanding these 
concerns, the recent ‘humanitarian space’ 
experience highlights donors’ important role in 
mobilising and strengthening political leadership 
in the UN system in Sudan; in linking with and 
strengthening the position of humanitarian 
organisations; and in encouraging greater 
cooperation and compliance from GoS on critical 
issues of humanitarian access. Despite continuing 
and severe constraints on diplomatic and 
humanitarian activity, the political process 
surrounding the Communiqué demonstrates that 
with creative and flexible leadership backed by 
political support, space remains for creative and 
constructive engagement on the part of UNMIS 
and the UNCT. 
 
3.6  New opportunities  
An important period of transition in diplomatic 
and humanitarian circles is currently underway in 
Khartoum. Key leadership posts have recently 
been filled in the UN system (including the SRSG, 
DSRSG/RC/HC and Head of OCHA)23, 
diplomatic corps (including the US and UK 
ambassadors) and humanitarian NGOs (country 
programme heads and advocacy advisers at NRC, 
Oxfam, World Vision, among others). These 
changes are taking place as new diplomatic and 
peace-making initiatives are afoot with the 
establishment and ramping-up to deployment of  
UNAMID; and also as new questions are being 
strongly raised, especially in Southern Sudan, 
about the insufficiently slow pace of progress in 
implementing the CPA, and the dangers this poses 
to peace. 
 
This situation raises the need for caution; 
particularly with the relatively rapid loss of senior 
experienced personnel, the restructuring of UN 
                                                                            
thereby extending supervision and constraints on 
humanitarian NGOs far beyond the realm of HAC. 
22 Including the new OCHA Head John Holmes, and 
US Special Envoy to Sudan, Andrew Natsios. 
23 Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, a senior Pakistani diplomat 
who previously served as the UN Secretary-General’s 
Special Representative to Iraq, was appointed to 
succeed Pronk as SRSG in September 2007. The post of 
DSRSG/RC/HC, critical in UNMIS coordination and 
planning, was filled in the same period; as was the 
vacant position of Head of OCHA in Sudan. 
operations and systems of engagement under 
conditions of political and resource pressure, and 
the demonstrated skills of GoS in manipulating a 
range of international diplomatic and humanitarian 
players on a shifting terrain.  
 
But the situation also presents important 
opportunities for political strengthening of the UN, 
donor and NGO roles in supporting peacekeeping 
and recovery. In this period of restructuring and 
transition, the consolidation of political leadership 
and strategic vision in the UN system 
organisations in Sudan will be critical. Both have 
been lacking, notably in the difficult 18 month 
period ending December 2007 during which the 
political leadership of UNMIS was rebuked by 
GoS, and the coordinating and planning authority 
of UNMIS led by the DSRSG/RC/HC was 
effectively eroded. In a revealing reflection of 
UNMIS’ diminished political leadership and 
credibility in early 2007, none of the more than 70 
sources interviewed in the field work identified the 
Acting SRSG and PDSRSG as the effective 
political head of UNMIS. Instead, most referred to 
the DSRSG as occupying – albeit problematically 
and weakly – the key political leadership role of 
the UN in Sudan. 
 
There is now pressing need to establish clear, 
centralised political direction  and authority within 
the UNCT, especially given the imminent co-
existence of two UN peacekeeping missions. 
Donors will have a critical role to play in 
strengthening and consolidating international 
political support for this evolving UN presence 
Sudan. Any revised and expanded UN “integrated 
mission” will also require close cooperation with 
non-UN humanitarian and development actors, 
through inclusive and clearly-structured 
consultations and operational links with key donor 
and humanitarian NGO representative structures; 
here, the recent NGO and donor-led humanitarian 
space initiative provides examples of workable 
and productive cooperative arrangements. Finally, 
with the geographical and political expansion of 
the UN’s role at a critical time in Sudan’s complex 
peacemaking processes, it is increasingly clear that 
renewed UN leadership can be effective only if it 
reflects a more wholistic strategic approach, which 
in turn demands a centralisation and consolidation 
of leadership backed by unambiguous political 
support. 
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4. Resource Issues 
4.1 UNMIS resource shortages 
4.2 MDTF and CHF 
4.3 Donor interventions 
4.4 New opportunities 
 
4. Resource Issues 
Funding of the UN’s integrated mission in Sudan 
has been challenged by problems of resource 
shortfalls, fragmented programme strategies and 
inadequate donor coordination. The increasing 
consumption of increasing financial, capital and 
human resources by the Darfur crisis has further 
eroded UNMIS’ situation. The performance of the 
UN and World Bank in setting the priorities and 
disbursement procedures for humanitarian 
assistance in Southern Sudan and the Three Areas 
has provoked complaints from the humanitarian 
sector, and changes in resource targeting and 
allocation are evident. There are important lessons 
to be learned as the UN prepares for UNAMID. 
 
4.1 UNMIS resource shortages 
Funding for UNMIS has been inadequate and 
increasingly stretched by the extension of the 
mission to include responsibility for humanitarian 
activities in Darfur. Currently four of UNMIS’ 
eleven regional offices are located in Darfur, and 
the region absorbs the majority of humanitarian 
spending in Sudan.24 In the shadow of Darfur, 
resource allocations within the UN in support of 
the CPA have been undermined.  
 
In UNMIS, funding gaps have been reflected in 
various operations, including significant shortfalls 
of staff in some operations. In one sector visited, 
UNMIS regional managers reported staff 
complements were 30% or more below expected 
levels.  At the same time, mission sources reported 
a comparatively high turnover / non-renewal of 
staff positions. These gaps have been exacerbated 
by an atypical profile of middle level staff, who 
tend to be younger and less experienced in UN 
missions than the norm.25 Some suggested that 
                                                 
24 In 2007, Darfur alone is earmarked US$652.8 million 
in humanitarian spending, about 52% of all 
humanitarian funding for Sudan. UN and Partners, 2007 
Work Plan for Sudan (2007). 
25 According to some UNMIS officials working at 
sector level, mission staff have been disproportionately 
recruited from the NGO sector, and there is an 
atypically low proportion of staff with previous UN 
peacekeeping experience. Comparatively low salaries 
personnel shortages were indicative of wider 
resource shortfalls within UNMIS, particularly at 
local level, which together diminished the 
mission’s capacity to respond effectively to both 
political and operational challenges on the ground. 
 
UNAMID’s establishment provides an important 
opportunity for renewed attention on the core 
priorities and funding needs of UNMIS. The UN’s 
current country Work Plan recognises the pressing 
importance for the CPA of recovery and 
development funding in Southern Sudan and 
Southern Kordofan, and implies a  shift of UNMIS 
funding and spending targets away from 
humanitarian activities outside of Darfur. The 
question remains, however, of whether recovery 
and development – and their critical peace-
building impacts, especially for areas with high 
numbers of returnees – will be prioritised by 
donors ahead of the needs of humanitarian relief in 
Darfur and the rest of Sudan. Recent budget 
figures indicate that humanitarian funding, 
narrowly defined as life-saving interventions, 
continues to attract the bulk of funding 
disbursements. 
 
4.2 MDTF and CHF 
The pooled funding instruments for supporting 
humanitarian and development work in Sudan 
have proved problematic in practice. The two 
primary sources of pooled funding are the Multi-
Donor Trust Funds (MDTF) and the Common 
Humanitarian Fund (CHF), in addition to which 
there are a number of multilateral and bilateral 
funding channels. Both the MDTF and the CHF 
have posed challenges for humanitarian and 
development activities. 
 
The MDTF mechanism, administered by the 
World Bank, emerged in the context of the CPA’s 
Wealth Sharing Protocol, and was expected to 
serve as  key channel of funding for capacity 
building and institutional strengthening in the 
early post-conflict recovery phase in Southern 
Sudan, Three Areas and the North. However 
processing and delivery of funding has been very 
slow, hampered by procedures, politics and 
capacity at both the Bank and at Government 
level.26 Government contributions, which are 
                                                                            
and benefits are seen by some as a contributing factor in 
this regard. 
26 Donor funding for government institutional 
development enabling greater take-up of MDTF 
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matched by and mixed with donor inputs to the 
MDTF, have also been below expectations. The 
resulting slow pace of funding and operational 
support through the MDTF has led to complaints 
from some NGOs that donors have failed to apply 
sufficient pressure on the World Bank to redress 
this problem. In Southern Sudan, GoSS has voiced 
rising concern over the slow implementation of the 
MDTF and the negative implications of non-
delivery of the “peace dividend” for political 
stability in the south, especially for the continuing 
returns programme. By April 2007 only 14% of 
total MDTF pledges for recovery and development 
in Southern Sudan had been implemented since 
2005. GoSS frustration and suspicion around the 
slowness of MDTF disbursements remained an 
important point of friction, and along with 
continuing disputes around wealth sharing, helped 
prompt GoSS’ politically precarious temporary 
withdrawal from cooperation in the Government 
of National Unity in late 2007.27   
 
The CHF was created in 2006 as a pooling 
mechanism for donor funds targeting humanitarian 
activities identified in the UN Work Plan. Here too 
there have been problems arising from the CHF’s 
administration, and the strategy for setting funding 
priorities via the Work Plan.28 Some NGOs report 
that CHF funds, administered by the UN, have 
been difficult to access due to cumbersome and 
poorly managed procedures. Several NGOs see the 
UN Work Plan as highly problematic: its annual 
planning timeframe is unrealistically short and 
artificial; its substance is not based upon well-
researched needs assessments; it fails to 
systematically incorporate the activities and 
strategies of significant humanitarian players 
outside the UNCT; and a clear basis for funding 
allocations is often difficult to grasp. There is 
                                                                            
funding has also been an issue, notably in Southern 
Sudan where some public institutions have been too 
weak or recently formed to be able to draw down funds. 
27 As of December 2007 the political tensions around 
GoSS’ suspension of participation appear to have 
settled, amid indications that resource flows from 
national earnings to GoSS had recently improved, and 
that processing of MDTF projects – if not project 
delivery – had also accelerated. 
28 For a useful evaluation of the first six months of the 
CHF, see Dirk Salomons, Evaluation of the Common 
Funds in the Sudan: Component Report for the Study 
Monitoring and Evaluation of Common Funds for 
Humanitarian Action (Center on International 
Cooperation, New York University, November 2006). 
widespread complaint by NGOs that UN agencies 
have benefited disproportionately from the CHF, 
with the effect that many NGOs have been 
displaced as equal, integrated partners in CHF-
funded humanitarian work. Some outside the UN 
see the CHF as a means by which UN agencies are 
able to cover their own costs while effectively 
engaging implementing agencies as contractors.29 
Several NGOs reported that they had requested 
donors to lobby UNMIS and specifically the RCO, 
to make the CHF’s disbursement criteria and 
mechanisms more transparent, accessible and 
predictable. 
 
4.3 Donor interventions 
Donor interventions in support of the CPA have 
been increasingly undermined by the international 
focus on Darfur crisis, insufficient attention to the 
changing needs of funding in Southern Sudan and 
particularly the Transitional Areas, and inadequate 
insistence upon accessibility to funding provided 
through instruments like the MDTF and the CHF. 
More broadly, donor interventions have also been 
a factor in the emergence of a fragmented, 
strategically weak approach to solving the 
complexity of interlinked crises in Sudan. Few 
donors have taken a wholistic approach to funding 
humanitarian and development work in Sudan that 
recognises the different needs, priorities and 
phasing of different regions and interests covered 
by the CPA. Rather, targeted donor funding has 
sometimes created divisions and imbalances 
among humanitarian and development agencies 
and activities.  
 
Some donors appear not to have taken full 
cognisance of the divisions within the UNCT, and 
have inadvertently contributed by their funding to 
the sharpening of differences and consolidation of 
imbalances among some agencies and structures, 
including the RCO and larger UN agency players. 
Some sources cite specific leading donors as being 
“obsessive” about the role of the RCO and its 
strategic importance as humanitarian coordinator, 
channelling substantial funding to the RCO while 
neglecting to consider the RCO’s weaknesses in 
leading the development of – and obtaining active 
UNCT support for – a unified country strategy.  
                                                 
29 However one recent report suggests that 
complaints over the allocation of CHF funds may 
have been ameliorated in 2007 by decentralisation 
of disbursement decision-making; see ODI, The 
Long Road Home, p.12. 
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The situation has been compounded on the terrain 
of NGOs by an important legacy of the North-
South war: the mostly separate administration of 
humanitarian assistance to the South and Nuba 
Mountains from outside the country through 
Operation Lifeline Sudan and through other 
activities in SPLA controlled areas. This 
administrative division of donor funding is 
changing but gradually, and the existence of 
separately managed North and Southern Sudan 
programmes by several larger NGOs reflects a 
continuing fragmented approach by donors that 
fails to address the full scale of the related 
political, security and developmental factors that 
stand as challenges to the CPA, not least of which 
is Darfur.   
 
Some NGOs, too, have not been in a position to 
undertake important and time-consuming steps of 
restructuring and merging divided country 
programmes into a coherent whole with unified 
overall strategies that allow for the considerable 
differences in context and need on the ground in 
different regions.  
 
Overall, these kinds of strategic and administrative 
shortcomings undermine capacity to develop a 
broader, more substantial approach to dealing with 
both systemic risks and local challenges to the 
CPA. 
 
4.4 New opportunities 
The establishment of UNAMID, and the lessons 
learned from two years of funding humanitarian, 
recovery and development activities in support of 
the CPA, present new opportunities for  
strengthening peace-building in Sudan. 
 
The transferral to UNAMID of funding for Darfur-
related peacekeeping and peace-building should 
enable a process of clarification around the core 
funding requirements of UNMIS. This is 
especially the case given that the focal point of 
UNMIS work is moving, in many locations, 
beyond humanitarian efforts towards development 
activities. Within UNMIS, there is evidence that a 
more adaptive, responsive approach to allocating 
resources is in the process of being implemented at 
regional level in Southern Sudan and the Three 
Areas.  
 
It seems clear that the UN, Government, donors 
and NGOs increasingly recognise the peace-
building implications of recovery and 
development work – particularly in areas heavily 
affected by large numbers of returns. Moreover, 
for UNMIS, the role of evidence-based needs 
assessments from ground-level agency operations 
is emerging as an indispensable component of 
planning and resource allocation. These are 
important lessons for both UNMIS and UNAMID, 
which need to be incorporated into future planning 
and funding processes. 
 
The main multilateral funding mechanisms are 
under increasing pressure from Government, 
NGOs and donors to improve their performance. 
With the imminent transfer of the weighty Darfur 
humanitarian budget to separate funding 
mechanisms, there is room for fresh thinking about 
the focus and scope of CHF humanitarian funding 
under the CPA; the needs to be met by new 
recovery and development funding; and the means 
by which UNCT planning is done, funding criteria 
set and allocation decisions made.  
 
With regard to the MDTF and the World Bank, 
recent experiences of administrative and 
procedural delays point to problem areas of 
programme design that may be considered in any 
parallel process of recovery and development 
funding associated with the new Darfur mission.  
There is a clear role for donors to play in insisting 
that blockages and obstacles that emerged with the 
CHF and MDTF be avoided at the outset in any 
new or revised schemes, through proper design 
and active consultation of key stakeholders. 
  
The restructuring of aid targeting UNAMID and 
UNMIS provides a clear and important 
opportunity to reemphasize the need for a more 
wholistic approach by donors to Sudan. The 
fragmentation of donor interventions, which has 
undermined the work of both UNMIS and broader 
efforts at peace-making in Sudan, now needs to be 
addressed in order to consolidate and strengthen 
the international community’s commitment to 
peace-building inside and outside the CPA. This 
will require a clear strategy supporting the 
coordination of peace-building efforts across the 
different regions of conflict in Sudan. 
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5.   Conclusions and Recommendations   
The peace process in Sudan is entering a new and 
complex phase which contains risks for the 
conflict in Darfur and the existing peace ushered 
in by the CPA. The securing of peace in both 
conflicts is critical for the stability of Sudan and 
the avoidance of further large-scale humanitarian 
disaster.  
 
The likelihood of sustainable peace depends in 
part on the capacities of UNMIS and UNAMID to 
make meaningful peacekeeping interventions 
under difficult conditions. Lessons learned from 
the international community’s engagement around 
the CPA will be critical for advancing the CPA 
process and mounting a strong new intervention 
through UNAMID. 
 
Peacekeeping in the Darfur and North-South 
conflicts demands efficient, well-resourced 
interventions that have strong political backing 
from the international community, and are led in 
the field by officials who are able to marshal and 
coordinate the activities of diverse donors, 
agencies and interests. The peacekeeping 
mandates for UNMIS and UNAMID will need to 
be confidently, resolutely defended and 
implemented. These missions also require 
adequate contributions from donors, improved 
strategic coordination among the UN, donors and 
humanitarian agencies, and strengthened 
integration of NGOs within the UN’s “integrated” 
country mission.  
 
The reality of multiple overlapping conflicts also 
demands a more broad-based, wholistic approach 
to building peace in Sudan. While international 
attention has shifted to focus on the establishment 
of UNAMID, it is essential for the international 
community to remain vigilant about the numerous 
challenges that continue to confront the 
implementation of the CPA. The pressing 
objective of peacemaking in Darfur is insufficient 
in itself: there can be no lasting peace in Darfur or 
East Sudan if the CPA breaks down. Strategic 
planning for the new UN mission and for the 
restructuring of the existing one must take into 
account the wider parameters of Sudan’s national 
conflict, because in practice these stand as key 
orienting elements for all combatant parties – not 
least of which, the GoS in Khartoum.   
 
The current situation of change – in the structure 
of the UN’s peacekeeping mission and its senior 
leadership, in the diplomatic corps in Khartoum 
and in parallel Sudanese peace processes which 
are advancing at varying pace – raises new 
opportunities for peacemaking as well as cause for 
caution.  The formation of UNAMID and the 
transfer from UNMIS of peacekeeping and 
humanitarian responsibilities for Darfur presents 
opportunities for rethinking the operational, 
administrative and strategic political priorities of 
UNMIS, at a time when new leadership of 
UMMIS and UNAMID are being put in place in 
the field, and leadership positions among key 
donors and NGOs in Sudan are changing. New 
operational-level forms of coordination and 
planning emerging in some UNMIS sectors 
provide signals about new ways to manage and set 
targets for peacekeeping support for both UNMIS 
and UNAMID.  
 
At the same time, the performance of the UN and 
donors in raising and allocating resources is 
coming under pressure for improvement from 
Government, NGOs and some donors. With the 
likelihood of more clearly segmented 
humanitarian and development funding between 
the two missions, there are new opportunities for 
the assessment of funding needs and priorities, 
particularly under UNMIS operations, which may 
contribute to more targeted, responsive and 
effective peace building interventions at local level 
– notably with regard to recovery and 
development spending in areas of high returns. 
The reality of UNAMID and UNMIS establishes 
an important point of departure for refocusing on 
the need for a more wholistic strategic approach to 
funding by donors. The fragmentation of donor 
interventions, which has undermined the work of 
both UNMIS and broader efforts at peace-making 
in Sudan, now stands as a critical problem in need 
of redress.   
 
To support and the strengthen the opportunities for 
improved international interventions that are 
emerging, and to diminish risks arising, the report 
makes the following recommendations based upon  
the fieldwork findings: 
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5.1   UN administrative and operational 
structures 
There is need for clearer and more effective 
decision-making and implementation at the UN 
country mission level, particularly with the 
establishment of UNAMID. This suggests 
measures are needed that will help to strengthen 
the existing UNMIS and UN Country Team, and 
establish clear lines of political and administrative 
authority within and between UNMIS and 
UNAMID. Such measures include: 
 reforming, centralising and consolidating 
management and leadership in the existing 
UN integrated mission and Country Team, 
particularly with regard to the SRSG’s 
central role in managing the country 
mission;  
 improving horizontal and vertical 
communication and management within 
and among the UN agencies, to avoid 
problems associated with ‘stovepipe 
reporting’, to take advantage of 
complementarities and synergies, and to 
benefit more effectively from diverse 
inputs from field-level operations;  
 strengthening advocacy by the UN in 
support of humanitarian access in all 
conflict areas, not solely Darfur;  
 improving systematic coordination and 
cooperation with non-UN agencies and 
NGOs, particularly at non-operational 
national level on issues of strategic 
planning and resource allocation targeting; 
and 
 clarifying the specific mandates and roles 
of UNMIS and its leadership structures, 
UNAMID, and other UN and multilateral 
agencies in support of the CPA and the 
Darfur peace processes.  
 
5.2   UN political leadership  
There is a widespread feeling among the UN, 
donor and NGO community in Sudan that 
uncertain and halting political leadership in the 
UN country mission in Sudan partly explains the 
current cycle of problems encountered from the 
Government of Sudan and other parties to conflict 
in Southern Sudan, the Three Areas, Khartoum 
and Darfur. There is also sentiment that this 
problem has emerged not only due to the difficult 
conjunctures faced by the country mission since 
2005 – including the perceived need by some in 
the UN country mission to make “trade-offs” 
made around the CPA in order to leverage UN 
access to Darfur – but also because of inadequate 
support from the UN Secretariat and international 
diplomacy efforts.  
 
These assessments imply several corrective 
actions, including: 
(i) stronger and unequivocal support by the 
UN Secretariat and its component 
agencies (including for example, OCHA) 
of the UN country presence in Sudan 
represented by UNMIS and UNAMID, 
including a greater demonstrated 
willingness by the Secretariat to pursue 
and defend the mandated role of both 
missions, their structures and leadership, 
and to hold all combatant parties 
accountable to agreements reached and 
approved by the UN and international 
community; 
(ii) clear, consistent and transparent political 
leadership by the political head of the UN 
mission in Sudan in engagements with 
Government, combatant and other armed 
groups, UN agencies and the UN Country 
Team, donors, international NGOs, local 
NGOs and other stakeholders in the 
Sudanese peace process; 
(iii) strong, clear and consistent leadership by 
UN agencies mandated to deal with 
humanitarian, recovery and development  
activities within the context of the UN’s 
integrated mission in Sudan, including for 
example OCHA and the UNDP; 
(iv) improved lobbying and advocacy by 
donors, in Sudan and internationally, in 
support of the UN’s mandated 
peacekeeping presence in Sudan; and 
(v) strengthened donor cooperation with, and 
advocacy on behalf of, humanitarian and 
development NGOs in Sudan, following 
recent progress made on the issue of 
‘humanitarian space’ by means of regular 
structured interactions between donors and 
international NGOs. 
 
5.3   Wholistic Strategy  
There is wide agreement among peacekeeping 
practitioners, humanitarian actors, observers and 
researchers that the interlaced complexity of the 
Sudanese conflict and the strategic guile of the 
Khartoum Government urgently require the 
development of a wholistic strategic approach to 
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peacekeeping by UNMIS and UNAMID. If such 
an approach has existed within UNMIS and the 
UN country mission to Sudan, it has been in little 
evidence up until now, and it certainly has not 
been a significant motivating factor in the 
development of operational policies and practices. 
Many donors, too, have failed to envisage and 
elaborate a comprehensive, unified approach to 
dealing with Government and supporting different 
mandated peace initiatives.  
 
In this context, actions required include: 
(i) development and communication of a 
unified strategic country approach to 
peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, 
and recovery and development efforts, led 
by the UN country team and including 
inputs from the array of peace-supporting 
stakeholders including UNMIS, 
UNAMID, UN agencies, donors, and 
NGOs; 
(ii) strengthening of systems for integrating 
needs assessment and responses from field 
and sector regional level at national 
decision-making level, including for 
example inputs from UNMIS, UNAMID, 
and other UN agencies, multilateral 
agencies, Government, local stakeholder 
parties and interests, donors, NGOs, and 
community, research and other bodies 
active on the ground;  and 
(iii) revision of the wholistic country strategy 
according to evidence obtained through 
(ii) above, and systems for the concordant 
revision of strategies, resource allocations, 
etc. at sector regional and local 
operational level. 
 
5.4    Donors 
Donors have been important, albeit inconsistently, 
in consolidating support for the UN mission in 
Sudan, unblocking political and funding obstacles, 
working towards and sometimes securing 
improved humanitarian access for NGOs and the 
UN when they have been interfered with, and as 
conduits for political mediation and peace-making. 
In the current context of change the role of donors 
in advancing the UN country mission will be 
critical. In addition to donor roles specified above, 
important supportive actions from donors in the 
coming period include: 
(i) the development and collective 
elaboration of wholistic strategic 
approaches to donor funding, particularly 
with regard to support for the CPA, where 
needs and critical points for donor 
intervention are changing, particularly in 
areas of high returns such as Southern 
Kordofan; 
(ii) improved donor lobbying and active 
supervision of funding mechanisms such 
as the CHF and MDTF, leading to 
strengthened targeting and implementation 
of humanitarian, recovery and 
development activities that are responsive 
to changing needs on the ground, 
transparent and equitably inclusive of UN 
and non-UN agencies in the allocation of 
funds;  
(iii) strengthened funding for the UN in Sudan, 
particularly given the diverse needs 
associated with peacekeeping in the CPA 
(including increasing activities for 
recovery and development) and 
humanitarian assistance in Darfur, and 
recognising the critical importance of both 
peacekeeping missions for each other and 
for the overall peace and stability of 
Sudan; and  
(iv) insistence on, and protection by donors 
through all diplomatic and political means 
possible, of the mandate and associated 
rights and privileges of the UN country 
mission in Sudan; and of international 
humanitarian actors operating under 
international humanitarian law. 
 
./. 
 
 
